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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1916 
_____________ 
 
JOSEPH ASKEW, Both individually and derivatively on 
behalf of the general assembly of the Church of the Lord 
Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE TRUSTEES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 
THE CHURCH OF THE LORD JESUS CHRIST OF THE 
APOSTOLIC FAITH INC., A Pennsylvania Not-For-Profit 
Corporation; KENNETH SHELTON, Individually, and as 
President of the Board of Trustees of the Trustees of the 
General Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of 
the Apostolic Faith, Inc.; JOHNCARLTON THOMAS; 
JOHNNY RAY BROWN; ANTHONY LAMB; ALONZO 
W. REAGAN; LEON BLIGEN; JAMES HENRY BROWN; 
ERIK SHELTON, All individually, and as Trustees of the 
Trustees of the General Assembly of the Church of the Lord 
Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc.; DONNA 
SHELTON; RUTH G. LIVINGSTON; MARY THOMAS, 
and all Individually, and as constructive Trustees 
_____________ 
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On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 09-cv-00015) 
District Judge: Honorable Stewart R. Dalzell 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 27, 2012 
____________ 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES, and HARDIMAN, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  June 28, 2012) 
 
Willie Pollins, Esq. 
Pollins Law Firm 
1725 Spruce St. 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 
 
Fincourt B. Shelton, Esq. 
504 Main St. 
Suite 100 
Darby, Pennsylvania 19023 
Counsel for Appellant Joseph Askew 
 
Danielle Banks, Esq. 
Caitlin E. Oberst, Esq. 
Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young LLP 
2600 One Commerce Square 
2005 Market St. 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 
 
Michael K. Twersky, Esq.  
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Fox Rothschild LLP 
2000 Market St. 
20th Floor 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103  
Counsel for Appellees The Trustees of the General 
Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the 
Apostolic Faith, Inc.; Kenneth Shelton; JohnCarlton 
Thomas; Johnny Ray Brown; Anthony E. Lamb; 
Alonzo W. Reagan; Leon Bligen; James Henry Brown; 
Erik Shelton; Donna Shelton; Ruth G. Livingston; and 
Mary Thomas   
 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, in part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”  We address whether these Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment insulate from civil court review the 
decision by a church leader to terminate an individual’s 
membership in a church. 
 
 The dispute stems from an internal schism in the 
Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith (“the 
Church”).  Appellant Joseph Askew associated with the 
dissident faction of the Church polity, leading the Bishop and 
leader of the majority faction, appellee Kenneth Shelton 
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(“Bishop Shelton”), to terminate his membership in the 
Church.  Asserting claims on behalf of himself as a church 
member and derivatively on behalf of the Church, Askew 
alleges that Bishop Shelton and officers of the affiliated 
Board of Trustees misappropriated church assets and 
breached their fiduciary duties to the Church.   
 
We conclude that the non-entanglement principle 
embedded in the Religion Clauses shields Bishop Shelton’s 
membership decisions from civil court review.  Correctly 
applying this principle, the District Court deferred to Bishop 
Shelton’s declaration that he terminated Askew’s membership 
in the Church.  Because Askew’s nonmember status deprives 
him of standing to assert claims alleging harm to the Church, 
we will affirm the dismissal of the case.  
 
I. 
 
The Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic 
Faith was founded by Sherrod C. Johnson in 1919.  In 1947, 
Johnson and several church elders established The Trustees of 
the General Assembly of the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ 
of the Apostolic Faith, Inc. (“the Corporation”), a non-profit 
corporation set up to hold and manage the real property and 
assets of the Church in trust.  Both the Church and the 
Corporation are headquartered in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
 
The Church, an unincorporated entity, is governed by 
its Rules and Bylaws, last amended in 1961.  The Bylaws 
establish two officers of the Church:  a General Overseer and 
a General Secretary.  The General Overseer (also known as 
the Bishop) serves for life, while the General Secretary must 
be nominated annually by the General Overseer and elected 
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by the General Assembly of the Church.  In the event of the 
death of the General Overseer, the General Secretary 
temporarily assumes his duties until the General Assembly 
meets to elect him or a successor as the new General 
Overseer.  The General Assembly, a body comprised of 
members of the congregation, meets annually and votes on 
church business and governance matters.  The Bylaws vest 
title to real and personal property of the Church in the 
Corporation.  
 
The Corporation is governed by its Articles of 
Incorporation.  The Articles make the General Overseer the 
President of the Corporation.  They authorize the President to 
nominate trustees to the Corporation, who in turn must be 
elected annually by the General Assembly.  They also restrict 
membership in the Corporation to the President and Board of 
Trustees.   
 
S. McDowell Shelton succeeded Johnson as General 
Overseer in 1961.  He died in 1991, prompting a crisis in 
succession.  Three men, including Kenneth Shelton and 
Roddy Shelton, laid claim to the General Overseer position.  
Roddy Shelton was the General Secretary at the time and thus 
should have temporarily succeeded S. McDowell Shelton 
under the Bylaws.  But many members of the Church 
disapproved of his leadership and preferred Kenneth Shelton.  
The faction loyal to Kenneth Shelton used threats and force to 
oust the faction loyal to Roddy Shelton from the Church in an 
acrimonious meeting held in early 1992.  Both men held 
separate General Assemblies and were elected General 
Overseer by their respective followers.  In the aftermath of 
the schism, the parties continued to battle their claim to 
authority over the Church and ownership of church assets in 
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Pennsylvania courts.  Over a decade ago, Pennsylvania courts 
concluded that Kenneth Shelton was the rightful General 
Overseer of the Church.  Trustees of the General Assembly of 
the Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith, 
Inc. v. Shelton, Nos. 92-1887, 94-0914, 94-3654, slip op. at 4 
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. June 12, 2000), aff’d, Church of the Lord 
Jesus Christ of Apostolic Faith, Inc. v. Shelton, 773 A.2d 
1290 (Table) (Pa. Commw. Ct. Apr. 10, 2001).   
 
Askew was a member of the dissident faction loyal to 
Roddy Shelton.  Since 1992, he has attended Roddy Shelton’s 
church and other churches affiliated with the dissident 
faction.  He does not accept Bishop Kenneth Shelton as the 
General Overseer of the Church.  On multiple occasions since 
the schism, Bishop Shelton declared all followers of Roddy 
Shelton nonmembers of the Church.  In August 2009, Bishop 
Shelton executed a sworn declaration stating that Askew and 
all others loyal to Roddy Shelton were removed from the 
Church in 1992 and have not been recognized as church 
members since that time.   
 
II. 
 
Askew initiated this suit in January 2009.  Named as 
defendants are Bishop Shelton and several trustees of the 
Corporation.  The Corporation is a nominal defendant.  The 
complaint alleges that Bishop Shelton and the trustees 
misappropriated assets of the Corporation for their own 
personal use at the expense of the Church and its members.  
Askew also alleges that, since 1992, the Corporation’s 
officers have not submitted annual financial statements of 
assets and liabilities to the Commonwealth, as required by 
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Pennsylvania’s Nonprofit Corporation Law (“PNCL”), 15 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 5101 et seq.   
 
The complaint asserts eight counts.  Count 1 alleges 
that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the 
Church and its members.  Count 2 alleges that the defendants 
breached their fiduciary duties to the Corporation.  Count 3 
seeks a declaration that the Articles of Incorporation are 
unlawful under the PNCL because they exclude Church 
members from membership in the Corporation.  Count 4 
seeks an injunction ordering the defendants to disclose the 
Corporation’s annual financial statements.  Count 5 seeks 
appointment of a custodian for the Corporation.  Count 6 
alleges unjust enrichment and seeks restitution of 
misappropriated assets.  Count 7 alleges civil conspiracy.  
Count 8 seeks imposition of a constructive trust.   
 
Contending that Askew lacked standing to assert the 
claims, the defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).  A Rule 12(b)(1) standing 
challenge may attack the complaint facially or may attack the 
factual basis for standing.  Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).  As the 
defendants had not answered and the parties had not engaged 
in discovery, the first motion to dismiss was facial.  The 
District Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part.  
It found that Askew had no standing to sue on behalf of the 
Corporation under the PNCL and therefore dismissed counts 
2, 4, and 5, all of which alleged harm to the Corporation.  
Taking as true Askew’s allegation that he was a member of 
the Church, the court denied the motion to dismiss as to 
counts 1, 3, and 6, all of which asserted claims on behalf of 
the Church.  Because Askew’s standing to assert those claims 
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depended on his status as a member of the Church, however, 
the court ordered the parties to engage in discovery on 
Askew’s claim to membership. 
 
The defendants filed a renewed motion to dismiss after 
a period of focused discovery.  Again, they argued that 
Askew lacked standing to pursue the claims.  The District 
Court treated this motion as a factual challenge to Askew’s 
standing and therefore consulted depositions, affidavits, and 
other pertinent evidence.  See CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 
132, 145 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that in evaluating a 
factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, the District Court 
may make factual findings based on material beyond the 
pleadings); 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350, at 159-60 (3d ed. 
2004).  Applying the non-entanglement principle embedded 
in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, the District 
Court accepted as binding Bishop Shelton’s August 2009 
declaration that Askew is not a member of the Church.  
Accordingly, it held that Askew lacked standing and 
dismissed the remaining claims.1  Askew timely appealed.2
 
  
 
                                              
1 The District Court dismissed counts 7 and 8 on the basis that 
they depend on the viability of other claims.  Askew does not 
challenge the dismissal of counts 7 and 8 in this appeal. 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “Our review of 
a District Court’s denial of Article III standing is plenary.”  
Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
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III. 
 
 Askew, the party seeking to invoke federal court 
jurisdiction, shoulders the burden of establishing his standing 
to sue.  Common Cause of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 
257 (3d Cir. 2009).  To do so, he must demonstrate that he 
suffered a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact that is 
“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”  Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quotation 
marks omitted).  That injury must be fairly traceable to the 
actions of the defendants and likely to be redressed by a 
favorable decision.  Id. at 560-61.   
 
Misappropriation of church assets could have caused 
Askew injury-in-fact, as an individual or derivatively, only if 
he is a member of the Church.  The core dispute, then, is 
whether Askew is a church member.  Askew contends that he 
is a lifelong member of the Church and remains a member 
today.  The defendants respond that because the highest 
authority in the Church declared Askew a nonmember, he is 
not a member of the Church and has no standing to assert the 
claims.  The decision to terminate Askew’s membership, they 
maintain, is uncontestable because it is a matter of 
ecclesiastical doctrine not amenable to review by civil courts. 
 
The First Amendment “severely circumscribes” the 
role that civil courts may play in resolving disputes touching 
on matters of faith.  Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440, 449 (1969).  Civil courts encroach on the autonomy of 
religious institutions when they inquire into ecclesiastical law 
and governance.  The non-entanglement principle, anchored 
in First Amendment values, thus “requires that civil courts 
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defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity 
by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization.”  
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); see also Kedroff v. 
Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. 
Am., 344 U.S. 94, 115-17 (1952).  In so doing, civil courts 
accept decisions of the highest religious decision-maker as 
binding fact, so long as those decisions are not tainted by 
fraud or collusion.  Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976); Gonzalez v. Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929). 
 
These bedrock principles, recently reaffirmed by the 
Supreme Court, derive from both Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 704-06 (2012).  
Civil court review of doctrinal matters inhibits free exercise 
of religion and usurps the power of religious authorities to 
resolve intrachurch matters purely of ecclesiastical concern.  
Id. at 706.  And it improperly cloaks the State with authority 
to “intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular 
doctrinal beliefs.”  Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709; see also 
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.  The Religion Clauses 
guard against such “government interference with . . . internal 
church decision[s] that affect[] the faith and mission of the 
church itself.”  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. 
 
Still, the First Amendment does not remove from the 
purview of civil courts all controversies involving religious 
institutions.  Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-03.  When a church 
dispute turns on a question devoid of doctrinal implications, 
civil courts may employ neutral principles of law to 
adjudicate the controversy.  Id.; Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. at 449; Scotts African Union Methodist Protestant 
11 
 
Church v. Conference of African Union First Colored 
Methodist Protestant Church, 98 F.3d 78, 88-90 (3d Cir. 
1996).  Pennsylvania courts opt to apply neutral civil law 
principles whenever possible to resolve such cases.  See, e.g., 
Presbytery of Beaver-Butler of the United Presbyterian 
Church in the U.S. v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, 489 
A.2d 1317, 1320-23 (Pa. 1985).  Indeed, they did so over a 
decade ago in their ruling that Bishop Shelton occupies the 
office of General Overseer.  See Trustees of the General 
Assembly, Nos. 92-1887, 94-0914, 94-3654, slip op. at 4.3
 
 
Whether the controversy over Askew’s membership in 
the Church is an ecclesiastical question or whether it may be 
resolved by reference to neutral principles of law is a matter 
of sharp disagreement between the parties.  The record 
indicates that, in this Church, the question of who is and is 
not a member depends in part on religious practice.  Article 
XX of the Church Bylaws provides: 
 
                                              
3 Askew invites us to reconsider the Pennsylvania court’s 
conclusion, reached by applying neutral principles of law, 
that Kenneth Shelton is the General Overseer of the Church.  
Askew Letter of Jan. 20, 2012, at 2-5.  As Askew did not 
raise the argument in the District Court, it is waived.  See In 
re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 262 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, this Court will not 
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.” (quotation 
marks and citation omitted)).  We have no warrant to question 
the holding of the Pennsylvania court on a matter that was not 
raised until after all briefings had been submitted and that in 
any event may be barred by estoppel principles.  
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Qualifications and membership shall be judged 
by the following: (a) Tithe paying[;] (b) Life 
being consistent with the doctrine of The 
Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the 
Apostolic standard[; and] (c) Regular 
attendance except when this is for the reason of 
long sickness or physical impossibilities; at 
such time the member is required to remain in 
contact with the General Overseer at regular 
intervals to explain reason of absence; as well 
as to one in charge of local assembly.  
 
Appendix 59-60.  The second requirement makes 
membership in the Church an ecclesiastical matter, for it 
conditions an individual’s membership on living in 
conformity with “the doctrine of [t]he Church.”  Id.  We 
know of no neutral principle of law that could assist in 
evaluating whether a member lives his or her life in a manner 
consistent with church doctrine.  
 
 The Bylaws also delegate to the General Overseer the 
power to determine membership status.  They contemplate 
two pathways for excommunication.  If a member “has been 
duly accused of an offense punishable by The Church, his 
status in The Church shall be determined solely by the 
General Overseer, until trial.”  Id. at 53.  Alternatively, when 
the General Overseer deems “it necessary for the good of the 
Church,” he may terminate an individual’s membership 
“without accusation or trial.”  Id.   
 
The General Overseer’s authority to excommunicate 
members falls squarely within the realm of matters insulated 
from civil court review.  As codified in its central governance 
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document, the Church entrusts the General Overseer with 
power to decide when it is in the best interest of the 
congregation to terminate an individual’s membership.  
Determining when excommunication is “necessary for the 
good of the Church” undoubtedly involves a complex 
balancing of spiritual and pragmatic considerations, all 
properly left to the highest church authority, not civil courts.  
We are not competent to upset judgments made by the 
General Overseer in this doctrinally sensitive area, for there 
are no neutral principles of law that shed light on the 
membership composition necessary for the good of the 
Church.  See Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. 
Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (providing examples of neutral 
principles of law that may be used to adjudicate church 
property disputes without jeopardizing First Amendment 
values); Scotts African Union, 98 F.3d at 94-95 (emphasizing 
the fact-intensive inquiry involved in deciding if a dispute is 
one of church governance and doctrine or one that may be 
resolved by applying neutral principles of law).  
 
Bishop Shelton, the General Overseer and the highest 
judicatory tribunal in the Church, testified that he declared 
Askew a nonmember on multiple occasions since 1992.  
Askew was, Bishop Shelton stated, a follower of Roddy 
Shelton.  And, ostensibly for the good of the Church, he 
terminated the membership of all churchgoers loyal to Roddy 
Shelton in the wake of the schism.  Consistent with the non-
entanglement principle, we accept his pronouncement as 
conclusive.  Any other approach would embroil this Court in 
a two-decade-long intra-Church battle central to its mission 
and spiritual identity. 
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Askew urges us to probe Bishop Shelton’s decision 
because, he says, the Bishop did not comply with the 
procedures for excommunication prescribed by the Bylaws.  
In essence, he objects that the decision is arbitrary as applied 
to him.  Controlling precedent forecloses his argument, for 
the Supreme Court held in 1976 that the First Amendment 
does not permit civil court review of the arbitrariness of 
ecclesiastical actions.  Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713-20; 
accord Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705.  Review of a 
church’s compliance with its own rules and regulations in 
arriving at a decision, reasoned the Court, “would undermine 
the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper 
subject of civil court inquiry.”  Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713.  
This case well illustrates the point.  We could not evaluate 
whether Askew was entitled to an accusation and trial or 
whether his termination was “necessary for the good of the 
Church” without delving into church teachings and making 
value judgments about what, in fact, is necessary for the good 
of the Church.  The First Amendment shields religious 
institutions from this sort of intrusive inquiry irrespective of 
their compliance with internal excommunication procedures. 
 
Askew also argues that Bishop Shelton’s August 2009 
declaration terminating his membership was a post hoc 
decision made for the impermissible purpose of divesting the 
District Court of jurisdiction.  We disagree.  A doctrinally 
grounded decision made during litigation to insulate 
questionable church actions from civil court review may 
indeed raise an inference of fraud or bad faith.  See id. 
(explaining that the fraud or bad faith exception may apply 
“when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes”).  
Under those circumstances, the integrity of the judicial 
system may outweigh First Amendment concerns such that a 
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civil court may inquire into the decision.  But we find no 
basis for the inference here.  Since 1992, Bishop Shelton has 
repeatedly declared all persons loyal to Roddy Shelton 
nonmembers of the Church.  Askew admittedly associated 
with the minority faction led by Roddy Shelton.  His 
membership in that class of individuals undercuts any 
inference that Bishop Shelton first declared him a nonmember 
in 2009 in order to thwart review by the District Court. 
 
We therefore hold that Askew has no standing to assert 
claims alleging harm to the Church.  Dismissal of counts 1, 3, 
and 6 — all claims asserted in Askew’s capacity as a member 
of the Church — was proper. 
 
IV. 
 
The District Court dismissed counts 2, 4, and 5 
because they allege harm to the Corporation, but Askew is not 
and has never been a member of the Corporation.  The PNCL 
limits standing to assert derivative claims to members of non-
profit corporations.  15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5782.  Askew does 
not contest the District Court’s finding that he was not a 
member of the Corporation, but rather maintains that a 
separate provision of the PNCL, 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5793(a), 
extends to him standing to sue by virtue of his membership in 
the Church.  Because Askew is not a member of the Church, 
his argument fails.  The District Court correctly held that 
Askew lacks standing under the PNCL to assert claims 
alleging harm to the Corporation. 
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V. 
 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
 
